School Attendance Orders: A Threat to Faith-Based Education and Family Autonomy
Clause 26 Grants Overreaching Powers to Local Authorities, Creating Significant Risks for Religious Communities and Home-Educating Families
APPENDIX B
School Attendance Orders (Clause 26)
Summary
1. The significance of this process of continuous surveillance can only be understood when one examines the sanctions that the local authority is mandated to impose on parents for any failures to comply with the registration process. This is addressed in Clause 26, a very lengthy series of amendments to the scheme of School Attendance Orders, under the Education Act 1996.
2. Although local authorities will not impose ‘monetary penalties’ on parents who fail to report their child, they will subject parents to far harsher measures, such as issuing new-style ‘Preliminary Notices’ and ‘School Attendance Orders’ under Clause 26 of the Bill. Meanwhile, educational providers will face punitive monetary penalties under the proposed scheme.
3. Clause 26 introduces nine extensive new sections to the Education Act 1996, establishing additional requirements for preliminary notices, the nomination of schools within these notices, and the amendment or revocation of School Attendance Orders (SAOs). Non-compliance with an SAO is classified as an offence under the proposed section 436P of the 1996 Act. The persistent threat of government orders creates significant stress and disruption, undermining the stability of a peaceful and law-abiding family and community structure.
4. The proposed Section 436H(3) defines a “preliminary notice” as a notice served to a parent, requiring them to demonstrate to the local authority that the child named in the notice is receiving a ‘suitable education’ or one that is in the child’s best interests. These preliminary notices may also be issued to parents who are deemed to have failed to provide the required information to the local authority or to have provided inaccurate information. While oversight is important, it is neither the role nor the place of the government to replace parents in determining what constitutes a child’s “best interest.”
5. The remaining proposed provisions outline a detailed process of imposition of School Attendance Orders in various stages, which extend over 13 pages of text.
Effects
6. The effects of these reforms can only be understood if one takes into account the open ended non-defined nature of ‘suitable education’, which is currently designed to impose a – secular – view of education in the United Kingdom to the detriment of faith-based views.
7. In spite of the detail provided on process, the Bill has nothing to add to the definition of ‘suitable education’ under s. 437A of the 1996 Act, which merely states:
In this Chapter, “suitable education”, in relation to a child, means efficient full-time education suitable to his age, ability and aptitude and to any special educational needs he may have (in the case of a local authority in England) or suitable to the child's age, ability and aptitude and to any additional learning needs the child may have (in the case of a local authority in Wales).
8. The term remains entirely open-ended, with no recognition of the special value of any particular element of education. A core goal of this Bill is to ensure ‘suitable’ education, yet ‘suitable’ is not even properly defined. This lack of definition undermines the very foundation of the Bill. It is like trying to build on quicksand: laws require solid foundations, yet this Bill is constructed on ambiguity and assumptions, rendering effective and fair implementation impossible. An undefined concept of ‘suitable’ education invites each local authority to interpret it as it pleases, leading to inconsistencies and arbitrariness.
9. Granting local authorities such broad and unchecked powers of surveillance, regulation, and control is certain to create significant friction and conflict with local communities, particularly those embracing non-majority faiths or beliefs. These families are left vulnerable, with no safeguards against indoctrination or other impositions by an overzealous local authority that, while perhaps well-meaning, may lack the understanding or tolerance necessary to respect their unique needs and values.
10. Neither the lengthy new sections proposed by the Bill, the explanatory notes, nor the ECHR Memorandum submitted by the government explicitly acknowledge that Haredi families[1] will fall under the scope of compulsory registration for home-educated children. They fail to recognise that these families will face ongoing surveillance and scrutiny by local authority officials and be subject to vague and ill-defined tests of ‘success’ in education.
11. These processes are in all likelihood designed to reflect the prejudices of a worldview for which the only credible education is secular education. There is no protection whatsoever for the world views taught and maintained by the Haredi or other faith-based community. The proposed scheme is an invitation for the indoctrination of children.
12. The ECHR Memorandum asserts only (at p. 36) that (any) religious parents may be affected disproportionately, hence triggering Article 14 of the ECHR, but that the infringement of their rights is modest because the system of registration is ‘not mandatory’ - a parent who refuses to provide the name of their child can fight any subsequent ‘School Attendance Order’ by ‘demonstrating that the child is receiving suitable education’ or challenging in court any ensuing criminal conviction (ECHR Memorandum, par 148, p. 36).
13. These arguments are extremely weak: registration is and will be experienced as compulsory, even if a few families successfully fight it in court. Suggesting that parents rely on the courts to resolve these issues is like advising someone to jump into a pit and climb out later - it imposes unnecessary hardship and disregards the significant burden it places on families. Furthermore, most ordinary families lack the financial and legal resources required to navigate the complexities of the court system, rendering this an impractical and inequitable solution. Registration is, in effect, mandatory, and the effect on religious minorities that choose to home educate, as opposed to other groups who choose to home educate, will be clearly discriminatory.
Under these circumstances the proposed changes enable local authorities to harass, obstruct and disrupt the Haredi community and its religiously mandated educational practices.
[1] The only exception is a single reference to the rights of ‘Orthodox Jewish parents’ at p. 47 of the ECHR Memorandum, in relation to the expansion of registration of independent educational institutions and Article 14 of the ECHR. The report accepts that Yeshivas will be affected, and it suggests that the ECHR is not thereby violated, citing the case of Konrad v Germany (Application 35504/03), 11 September 2006. The memorandum fails to note that the case concerned a Christian couple seeking to homeschool their children: a) in a predominantly Christian state, and b) in a state that does not allow the homeschooling of primary school children at all. The case of regulating minority Orthodox Jewish communities educating their children in a state that allows home education and is predominantly Christian is an entirely different case and was not addressed in Konrad v Germany.